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## Off

A. Interpretation – engagement is a strategy depending on positive incentives which seeks to shape the behavior of a target country

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The term ‘engagement’ was popularised in the early 1980s amid controversy about the Reagan administration’s policy of ‘constructive engagement’ towards South Africa. However, the term itself remains a source of confusion. Except in the few instances where the US has sought to isolate a regime or country, America arguably ‘engages’ states and actors all the time simply by interacting with them. To be a meaningful subject of analysis, the term ‘engagement’ must refer to something more specific than a policy of ‘non-isolation’. As used in this article, ‘engagement’ refers to a foreign-policy strategy which depends to a significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. Certainly, it does not preclude the simultaneous use of other foreign-policy instruments such as sanctions or military force: in practice, there is often considerable overlap of strategies, particularly when the termination or lifting of sanctions is used as a positive inducement. Yet the distinguishing feature of American engagement strategies is their reliance on the extension or provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries with which the US has important disagreements.

That means the plan must be a quid-pro-quo

De LaHunt, 6 – Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department (John, “Perverse and unintended” Journal of Chemical Health and Safety, July-August, Science Direct)

Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box, one separate from incentives. But fundamental problems plague the incentive approach. Like coercion, incentives are poor motivators in the long run, for at least two reasons – unintended consequences and perverse incentives.

## Off

The affirmative’s project devolves into a propagation of death zones under the guise of globalized liberalism

Calkivik 10 (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

Yet, it is equally difficult—and worse, disingenuous—to ignore how terror has¶ become a governing principle of global life. This is a terror that marks dead bodies,¶ starving bodies, and bleeding bodies. It is a terror that resides not only in spectacular¶ moments of contest over claims to sovereign power and/or imperialist and colonial¶ ambitions as we have been witnessing in the bombings of Afghanistan and the¶ invasion of Iraq. It is a terror that marks the everyday when “soldiers entice children¶ like mice into a trap and murder them for sport”18 or when peasants commit suicide¶ due to rising costs of cultivation and mounting debt.19 It is a terror that is incarnated in¶ the demarcation of the “globalized” world between life-zones and death-zones.20 In¶ the death zones of humanity, as Balibar describes, what reigns is “a mode of¶ production for elimination.”21 The object/subject of this mode of reproduction are¶ human beings who are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always¶ already superfluous. It is a time of terror that manufactures disposable beings and¶ targets not only life in all of its forms, but also dissent, critical reflection and, maybe¶ more crucially, the possibility of politics.¶ This web of terror needs to be thought of together with other webs that span¶ the globe and animate contemporary discourses on international politics—webs that¶ are perhaps better depicted as webs of life, debt, and death beyond mere figures of¶ speech. One of these is the world wide web, epitomized in the triumphant narratives of¶ liberalism as the symbol of globalization. Until recently, such narratives circulated¶ widely and confidently within some circles, trumpeting—in presentist and apocalyptic¶ tones of a distinctly different inflection—an “end of history”22 in the realization of a¶ world that is “flat.”23 In the 1990s, with the entire planet imagined as an open space¶ for capitalist valorization, the dots interlinking major financial centers became a¶ favored form of mapping, of representing, “global reality.” In such accounts the world¶ was depicted as encompassed by a global dynamic that can and will only render it¶ richer, freer, and more secure—even if its participants are encumbered by the¶ constraints of a golden straightjacket of debt and structural adjustment programs.¶ Instances of violence and destitution were and are taken not as symptoms of the¶ proliferation of global liberal values; they are treated as indications that the¶ proliferation has not yet proceeded fully. If an image disturbed this utopia-in-present,¶ it was to be rendered silent, regarded as a local anomaly, a remnant of a past age or a¶ problem that could be fixed by proper global incorporation and governance in the¶ brave new world encompassed and represented by the Web.24¶ One of the classic statements supporting this assertion is Mary Kaldor’s New¶ and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Globalized Era, which investigates the¶ connections between globalization and changing forms of political violence.25¶ According to Kaldor, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of a new type of¶ organized violence that blurred public/private, local/global, state/non-state¶ distinctions. These new forms of political violence were not merely old wars¶ undertaken with new weapons thanks to information technologies and a concomitant¶ revolution in military affairs. These “new wars”, Kaldor suggested, were the outcome¶ of “a revolution in social relations of warfare”26 and the “inevitable encroachment of¶ globalization”27—globalization designating the intensification of global¶ interconnectedness in political, economic, military, and cultural realms. The new wars¶ were distinguished in terms of their goals (i.e., identified as “backward looking¶ political projects”28 enacted around exclusivist identities), their methods of warfare¶ (i.e., seeking neither territorial capture nor population control through capturing hearts¶ and minds), and the new war economies they enacted. The solution Kaldor offers is¶ the “reconstitution of the control of organized violence by public authorities” and¶ working toward a “cosmopolitan political project which would cross the global/local¶ divide and reconstruct legitimacy around an inclusive, democratic set of values.”29¶ Such a cosmopolitan regime, according to Kaldor, already existed; what was lacking¶ was its enforcement.30¶ Only a decade later, the turn of the century heralded yet another allegedly new¶ era of new wars, presenting itself in sharp contrast to the comforting imagery so¶ prevalent only a decade before. With the declaration of a temporally and spatially¶ limitless war on terror, we are now faced with a web that connects New York to Kabul¶ to London to Fallujah to Naples to Guantanamo and beyond. As shock waves surge¶ through bodies caught up in networks of secret rendition and torture, the normalization¶ of exceptional measures exposes the uneasy balance struck between liberty and¶ security within liberal democracies, laying bare the fragility of the espoused “global”¶ values and raising challenging questions about liberal projects for peace.¶ Sustained attention to the relationship between security and liberalism in the¶ wake of the declaration of the War on Terror is symptomatic of this development. One¶ prominent example came from the European Union. The “Challenge” (The Changing¶ Landscape of European Liberty and Security) Project, funded by the European Union,¶ brought together a wide range of scholars and experts to investigate and make policy¶ recommendations on the “illiberal practices of liberal regimes.”31 As described on the¶ project website, security concerns had brought about this need to reflect on the costs¶ these “new regimes and practices of security…in the context of the new evolving¶ international environment shaped by the events of September 11, 2001 and the recent¶ wars in Afghanistan and Iraq” might have on “civil liberties, human rights and social¶ cohesion in an enlarging Europe.”32¶ Let me note in passing that formulating the central problem as a matter of¶ illiberal deviations in liberal regimes is based on the assumption that a properly¶ functioning liberal order is a cure for violence and insecurity. To recall one of the¶ most authoritative representations of modern sovereignty and the liberal state—a¶ narrative widely embraced by International Relations theorists as well—Leviathan¶ emerges through a founding act that gives form to shapeless chaos, through a pact¶ established by the consent of all. While this narrative presents security as the promise¶ of the sovereign, it is a representation that conceals the double violence that lies at its¶ core. The underlying ambiguity is wryly captured by Foucault when he re-articulates¶ the formula as “[g]o get slaughtered and we promise you a long pleasant life.”33 The¶ fear of violent death, not free will, produces this pact. Law provides security only if¶ there is a sovereign capable of repression for the sake of order and security. Put¶ differently, security is a good that can be sustained only through institutionalized¶ violence—the “rationalized bloodless violence” that Benjamin elaborates in his¶ discussion of law and the modern state.34 Or to put it in Agamben’s powerful¶ formulation, “human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an¶ unconditional capacity to be killed.”35

This manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing the contradictions of imperial knowledge production – this dissident act fractures hegemonic thought

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30)

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective¶ of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its¶ poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance¶ either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he¶ influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation¶ of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must,¶ rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving¶ a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism¶ of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political¶ Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his¶ or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics¶ capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental¶ political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant,¶ the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities;¶ they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the¶ same world-historical event.¶ The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum¶ “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse¶ of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive¶ systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent¶ to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can¶ be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of¶ liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any¶ rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different,¶ “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific¶ politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics¶ of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure¶ of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented¶ discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its¶ critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing¶ the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege¶ it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues,¶ in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling—¶ disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory¶ logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical¶ logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project¶ proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that¶ being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though¶ unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses¶ its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological¶ subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender,¶ and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or¶ global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory¶ political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized)¶ by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary¶ representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do¶ not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference”¶ (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the¶ differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible”¶ or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt¶ “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah”¶ (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus¶ in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha),¶ “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben),¶ “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and¶ Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international¶ post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern”¶ black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily¶ to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics:¶ The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to¶ explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because¶ they appear almost always in conjunction with representations¶ of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or¶ under complete control, these images of blinding whiteness seem¶ to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is¶ the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence¶ that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear¶ and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature¶ seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex¶ and contradictory situation in which American writers found¶ themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38¶ In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of¶ the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think¶ the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to¶ know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking¶ the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven¶ relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold¶ War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and¶ operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that¶ ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s¶ perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible¶ as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary¶ problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented¶ discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance¶ with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological¶ and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present¶ uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established¶ by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture,¶ I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming¶ the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of¶ the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the¶ post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according¶ to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives¶ that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne¶ apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy¶ and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested,¶ will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity¶ constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a¶ continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical¶ Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary¶ (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment¶ liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also¶ show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would¶ obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring¶ to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post-¶ Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced¶ the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the¶ adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized)¶ the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian¶ thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories¶ to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently¶ administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

## International Credibility

There is no uniqueness to this advantage—no evidence that multilat is declining now – here’s evidence that says the opposite

Walt 11 (Stephen, Professor of International Relations – Harvard University, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?” Foreign Policy, 12-5, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us\_credibility\_is\_not\_our\_problem, GDI File)

--threats to our cred are always exaggerated

--nobody can overtake us

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies. The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.) There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I've never really understood whyleaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

The plan fails and public backlash takes out solvency

Lake 10 (Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego, David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//NG

At the same time, if any organization is to be an effective restraint on the United States, other countries will have to make serious and integral contributions to the collective effort. Both sides to this new multilateral bargain will need to recognize and appreciate the benefits of a stable international order to their own security and prosperity and contribute to its success - 480 Making America Safe for the World. The United States will need to continue to play a disproportionate role in providing international order, even as it accepts new restraints on its freedom of action. Other countries, however, must also contribute to the provision of this political order so that they can provide a meaningful check on US authority. ¶ Americans are likely to resist the idea of tying their hands more tightly in a new multilateral compact.

Litany of alt causes

Burgsdorff 9(Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, http://aei.pitt.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/11047/1/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf)//NG

As a matter of fact, together with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.

Representations of China as a threat ignore the normative value-judgments inherent to the process of claiming to empirically know Chinese national and political identity—this makes security threats self-fulfilling prophecies

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China and its relationship with the United States has long been a fascinating subject of study in the mainstream U.S. international relations community. This is reflected, for example, in the current heated debates over whether China is primarily a strategic threat to or a market bonanza for the United States and whether containment or engagement is the best way to deal with it. (1) While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means**.** For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world." (2) Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment." (3) Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature--themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions. These themes are of course nothing new nor peculiar to the "China threat" literature. They have been identified elsewhere by critics of some conventional fields of study such as ethnography, anthropology, oriental studies, political science, and international relations. (4) Yet, so far, the China field in the West in general and the U.S. "China threat" literature in particular have shown remarkable resistance to systematic critical reflection on both their normative status as discursive practice and their enormous practical implications for international politics. (5) It is in this context that this article seeks to make a contribution. I begin with a brief survey of the "China threat" argument in contemporary U.S. international relations literature, followed by an investigation of how this particular argument about China is a discursive construction of other, which is predicated on the predominant way in which the United States imagines itself as the universal, indispensable nation-state in constant need of absolute certainty and security. Finally, this article will illustrate some of the dangerous practical consequences of the "China threat" discourse for contemporary U.S.-China relations, particularly with regard to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident.

The aff’s North Korea representations are militaristic attempts to stifle political dissent and exert coercive control over the orient – a strategy like the affirmative’s can only lead to napalm and radioactive ash

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 4-1-13, “US Protection Racket Root of Korea Conflict,” http://nsnbc.me/2013/04/01/us-protection-racket-root-of-korea-conflict/) gz

The conflict emanates from Washington and is perpetuated by Washington. Why? To justify what would otherwise be seen as simply outrageous US militarism in the Asia Pacific hemisphere, and in particular a criminally aggressive agenda towards the main geopolitical targets of Washington – China and Russia. Korea’s conflict is not primarily about North and South “enemy states”. It is, as it has been for the past 68 years since the end of World War II, about Washington using military force to criminally assert its hegemony on the global stage. But you wouldn’t know this from a casual reading of the Western news media. No, we are told over and over again that the US is “protecting” South Korea and its other Asian allies. The military presence of the US is “serving” as a “deterrent” to aggression from a “sinister” North Korea. In this depiction, the US is the good guy, while North Korea is the menacing reprobate that is a scourge on everybody’s well-being and security. Kim Jong-un is the embodiment of the Axis of Evil. That so-called “quality” news media such as the BBC, New York Times and Guardian can get away with seriously presenting this situation in terms portraying the US as a benevolent force is an astounding feat of reality inversion and brainwashed mind control. The irony is that such media implicitly mock North Korea as a Stalinist “Big Brother” state, where critical thought and expression are forbidden. Yet, these media display the very same habit of mental conformity that they disparage North Korea for. As noted above, the only way of properly interpreting the recent weeks of threat and counter-threat of all-out war in Korea is to recall scenes from the classic Mafia movie, The Godfather. You know the drill. The mobster goes around the neighborhood demanding loyalty, respect and tributes “for protection”. If the residents don’t conform to the racket, then the boss arranges self-fulfilling violence to rain down on those who dare to reject his magnanimous “protection”. The exact same arrangement applies in Korea under the tutelage of the US. The Peninsula was unilaterally partitioned in 1945 by Washington into North and South statelets because the US could not abide the fact that the Korean population at that time was strongly anti-imperialist and yearning for socialist democracy. That egalitarian sentiment helped the Koreans resist the occupying Japanese imperialists prior to and during World War II. Tellingly, in order to assert its hegemony over Korea and the Asia Pacific, the US worked the neighborhood over assiduously in order to defeat the popular movement for independence and democracy that the Korean people exhibited so boldly. Washington achieved this by installing pro-Japanese collaborators as the rulers of newly formed South Korea. Think about that one. The US fought a war allegedly to defeat fascism and imperialism, only to immediately collude with the same political forces to defeat Korean democracy. The dropping of the atomic bombs by Washington on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was part and parcel of American efforts to demarcate a postwar hegemony in the Asia Pacific to the Soviet Union and China – and this is why Korea was also fractured into two alien states that were then precipitated into war between 1950-53. That war – in which a third of the northern Korean population were exterminated by American indiscriminate carpet-bombing and napalm incineration – has never officially ended. The armistice signed in 1953 under Washington’s dictate is technically only a ceasefire. For decades, North Korea’s demand for a full peace treaty has been repeatedly rejected by Washington and its South Korean client state. In other words, Washington has retained the implicit prerogative to resume its aerial bombardment of the North Korean population at any time it chooses. That constitutes a constant threat, or a policy of state terrorism by Washington. The threat from the US towards the Korean population has and continues to include nuclear annihilation. During the Korean War, the US air force would regularly fly nuclear-capable B-52 bombers over the Peninsula. People on the ground would recognize the aircraft, but they did not know what the operational intent was. Can you imagine the terrorism that this conveyed? – barely five years after the US vaporized the civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and at the same time that US military were compelling Koreans to live in caves as the only way of escaping mass destruction from conventional bombing. This same thuggish behaviour by the US government is consistent with its authorization during this past week for the flying of nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers over the Korean Peninsula. The dropping of “inert bombs” by these aerial monsters has to be seen as a heinous calculation in Washington aimed at heightening the terrorism. Yet, absurdly, the Western propaganda organs, otherwise called news, portray this American state terrorism as “protection”. The New York Times, for example, quoted one so-called “expert” as explaining North Korea’s response to the latest American provocation by saying: “The North Korean populace has to be regularly reminded that their country is surrounded by scheming enemies. Otherwise, they might start asking politically dangerous questions.” The laugh about this brain-washed expert thinking, and the New York Times promoting it, is that the people of Korea are indeed surrounded by a scheming enemy – the US – and if the wider international public and media were to start thinking about that fact then there would be “politically dangerous questions” such as: what gives the US the right to conduct annual military “war games” off and on the Korean Peninsula for the past six decades, including the deployment of nuclear annihilation? The people of Korea, North and South, deserve and desire peace. Despite the antagonism and belligerence highlighted in the Western propaganda media, the majority of people of North and South Korea have in fact no wish for war. The consensus among ordinary Koreans is for peace and a democratic resolution to decades of conflict imposed on their homeland from outside. But they won’t obtain that reasonable condition as long as Washington continues to run its “protection racket”. And, unfortunately, the American government will not, cannot stop its criminal behaviour – because domination, aggression and terrorism are the hallmarks of Washington’s Mafia regime.

**No impact to credibility**

Tang 5 – Shiping Tang, associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, January-March 2005, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 34-62

The general validity of reputation, however, has come under assault. Whereas in 1961 Glenn Snyder touted the virtue of drawing the line in places such as Quemoy and Matsu,4 he later all but acknowledged the flaw of his logic.5 Likewise, a decade after claiming that "a state can usually convince others of its willingness to defend its vital interests by frequently fighting for interests others believe it feels are less than vital,"6 Jervis was no longer so sure in 1982: "We cannot predict with great assurance how a given behavior will influence others' expectations of how the state will act in the future."7 This assault on reputation remains anathema for most politicians (and many political scientists). As statesman Henry Kissinger warned his colleagues, "No serious policymaker could allow himself to succumb to the fashionable debunking of 'prestige,' or 'honor\* or 'credibility.'"8 Judging from politicians' rhetoric and behavior, Kissinger's advice has been well taken. There seems to be a gap, therefore, between politicians' persistent obsession with reputation and scholars' increasing doubt about reputation's importance, and that gap is widening. Several more recent studies have taken the case against reputation (and credibility) even further.9 Compared to previous studies, these tend to be more systematic and better grounded empirically. They can be divided into two categories. The first group of work focuses on the impact of politicians' concern for reputation on state behavior and concludes that the concern for reputation has had a profound influence on state behavior in conflicts.10 The second group of work, taking politicians' belief in reputation as a fact, argues that this belief is unjustified because reputation in international conflicts is difficult, if not impossible, to develop. To put it differently, this line of work contends that reputation actually does not matter as much as politicians usually believe, if it matters at all.11

No impact to heg

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At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

## OAS

Economic engagement is an imperialist tool used to forward US geopolitical dominance – economic influence perpetuates the North/South geographical divide which makes war inevitable

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Political domination can take on many forms. At¶ its most basic and uncompromising, it is based on¶ military relationships between two or more parties.¶ Much of the rationale behind the proliferation of¶ nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for instance,¶ was based upon the West and the East’s need to secure¶ strategic military and, therefore, political advantage¶ over their enemies. This became the main justiﬁcation¶ for the global political and military face-off between¶ East and West that characterised the international¶ relations of the Cold War. A more recent example has been the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan¶ over the disputed province of Kashmir (Dodds 2000:¶ 103–6). Once again, overt displays of the military¶ might of the two countries have been used as a means¶ of securing strategic, military and political advantage¶ within the region. Political forms of geopolitical¶ domination can also occur in more subtle and hidden¶ ways. A good instance of this is the persistent military¶ inﬂuence of the United States in neighbouring countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America ¶ (see Dodds 2000: 57). The most infamous examples ¶ of these more covert efforts by the United States to¶ influence the internal politics of other independent¶ states have been in Guatemala, Nicaragua and **Cuba**.¶ These latter examples also begin to demonstrate the¶ strong connections between political and economic¶ aspects of geopolitical strategy, where political interference is accompanied by various forms of **financial**¶ **aid**. A key method of securing geopolitical inﬂuence¶ and dominance in recent years has been the ﬁnancial¶ and technological aid offered by dominant countries to¶ other, needy countries. In many ways, if military might represents the ‘stick’ of international relations, then¶ ﬁnancial aid is the ‘carrot’. Numerous examples exist¶ to demonstrate the role of economic influence in¶ shaping international geopolitical relations. In the¶ period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for¶ instance, there was much debate in the international¶ community concerning the best way to secure the¶ freedom of the latter. Much of the political shenanigans¶ of the period took place in the corridors of the United¶ Nations in New York. The famous journalist John¶ Pilger (1992) has noted how the United States tried¶ to use its economic muscle as a way of securing the¶ support of other states for its plan to mount an invasion¶ of Kuwait and Iraq. In this respect, its main efforts were¶ directed towards the non-permanent members of the¶ Security Council of the United Nations, which, at that¶ time, included one of the poorest states in the world,¶ Yemen. It is a little-known fact that Yemen voted not¶ to support an invasion of the Middle East by American led UN forces. In the immediate aftermath of the vote,¶ it is alleged by Pilger (1992), the Yemeni ambassador¶ to the United Nations was informed by his US counterpart that that was the most costly decision he¶ had ever made. In the following weeks, $70 million of¶ proposed US aid to Yemen was cancelled, the World¶ Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to¶ question the economic practices of the Yemeni state¶ and 800,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi¶ Arabia. As Dodds (2000) has argued, occurrences such as¶ these are part of a broader range of economic strategies¶ that help certain Northern states to achieve geopolitical¶ dominance over Southern countries. The influence ¶ of industrialised countries over institutions such as ¶ the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and ¶ the World Trade Organisation has been particularly¶ important. It has helped to generate an additional ¶ layer of compliance within international relations. The¶ best example of this process is the so-called ‘structural¶ adjustment programmes’ of the World Bank, which¶ seek to constrain the range of economic and political¶ policies that can be pursued by less industrialised¶ countries (Dodds 2000: 17; see also Krasner 2001:¶ 28–9). The criticism levelled at these programmes is¶ that they reify a particularly industrialised model of¶ development on southern states and, as such, represent¶ **a new form of informal imperialism by northern states.¶** In many ways, these examples illustrate the strong¶ connections between geopolitics and the broader international political economy (see Agnew and Corbridge¶ 1995).¶

The affirmative’s discourse of “failed states” legitimizes an interventionist epistemology that effaces difference, makes north-south inequality inevitable, and is self-fulfilling

Eisenträger 12 (Stian Eisenträger, MA student in IR, board member at International Reporter, a Norwegian NGO, 3-27-12, “Failed State or Failed Label?: The Concealing Concept and the Case of Somalia,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/failed-state-or-failed-label-the-concealing-concept-and-the-case-of-somalia/>) gz

The end of the Cold War shaped a new international political context where the issues of democracy and human rights were brought out from the internal to the external scene. The weakened role of the Soviet Union gave the United States the possibility to increase its global influence. In this context *the absence of effective government* emerged on the world political agenda together with the concept of the “failed state” (Akpinarli 2009). Boutros Boutros-Gali and Kofi Annan, the former Secretaries-General of the UN, used the “failed state” term as early as in 1990, although the General Assembly or the Security Council never used it. Somalia, which was a typical case of the absence of effective government, was described by the UN without the use of the term “failed state”. The concept was then applied for the first time in the article “Saving Failed States” published in the winter edition of Foreign Policy Magazine in 1992-1993 (Helman & Ratner). This article, which was written in the post-Cold War context with its high aspirations for democracy, human rights, the more active role of the United Nations in safeguarding collective security and the emergence of the United States’ as the leading agenda-setting actor, established the basic concept and the paradigm. Although some have tried to incorporate “failed states” in international law, the term is highly debated because of the neo-colonial notion attached to it (Akpinarli 2009, 87-89). According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word “fail” can have a range of different meanings: “to lose strength”, “to fade or die away”, “to stop functioning normally”, “to fall short”, “to be or become absent or inadequate”, “to be unsuccessful” and “to become bankrupt or insolvent” (Merriam-Webster 2011). Thus, I would argue that the word is too imprecise to be meaningful in our attempt to broaden our understanding of the world. In addition, the word is heavily value-laden and has loads of negative connotations attached to it, and therefore I find it unsuitable to use in science. That journalists and politicians still use the term, which is both catchy and tabloid, is understandable when we take into consideration the rather brutal limitations of time and space these two occupational groups have in their struggle to reach their audiences. Nevertheless, numbers of scholars have used and still use the failed state label, many even without engaging critically with the term (Bates 2008; Ghani & Lockhart 2008; Holzgrefe & Keohane 2003, just to mention a few). The urge to “fix”: Securitization and intervention The failed state paradigm implies that there is something that needs to be “fixed” or “saved” – of course by “good” liberal democratic external forces. “Preventing states from failing, and rescuing those that do fail, are (…) strategic and moral imperatives”, Robert I. Rotberg (2002) proclaims in an article with the dramatic title “Failed States in a World of Terror” (the argument is elaborated in his book, bearing the same title). One can feel the notion of “the white mans burden”. One of the most neoliberal contributions in the failed states debate is probably that of Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart (2008, 124) who in their book “Fixing failed states” boldly declare that “today states must fulfil their citizens’ aspirations for inclusion and development and also carry out a constellation of interrelated functions”. They conclude that states “in the world today” should perform ten key functions, which are: 1) Rule of law; 2) A monopoly of the legitimate means of violence; 3) Administrative control; 4) Sound management of public finances; 5) Investments in human capital; 6) Creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 7) Provision of infrastructure services; 8) Formation of a market; 9) Management of public assets; 10) Effective public borrowing. So now when we have the list, can we just go out in the world and start “fixing”? Fixing “failed states” is a dangerous exercise: For many policymakers the failed state label contributes to open up for and make a good excuse for military and other interventions. Petra Minnerop shows how the US throughout the second half of the 20th century developed several terms, for example “rogue states”, for “states to which it ascribed a high threat potential as regards the United States and international security” (2003). In the years to follow after the 1992 article in Foreign Policy Magazine the international community, with the US in the leading role, carried out military interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis that the chaotic situation in these states poses a threat to the US and international security in general. The terms “failed state”, “rogue state” and “war on terror” have all been given prominent roles in the public debate. As Akpinarli also remarks, these concepts have been invented by the North to “solve” problems in the South, as well as to advocate for and justify military interventions to protect international peace and security (Akpinarli 2009). I would argue that the concept rather causes more trouble than it solves – not only in terms of military intervention, but also by keeping “failed” states in the margins of international relations. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the labelling of “failed states” is a prime example of what the Copenhagen School of Security has dubbed *securitization*. The founding fathers of this concept point out that “a discourse that takes form of presenting something to an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). The audience – in this instance, ordinary citizens in the North – has to a large extent accepted the “failed state” paradigm, especially with reference to Somalia. Both the media and the large organizations working with/in/for the “failed state” are acting as agents for the securitizing actors – that is the governments in the North, especially the United States’ government. Somalia has been among the top five on the list since the first Failed States Index was published in 2005, and since 2008 Somalia has had the dubious honour of being the world’s “most failed state”. Whether it is possible to measure a state’s “failure” is a question that probably requires a book to be answered. Since 2005 the magazine and Fund for Peace have ranked the world’s countries after measuring the following variables: Demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace 2011). No doubt that all these measurements may give a good indicator of how the situation is in a number of countries. However, my point and critique is that the index fails in grasping the vast empirical variations within the research object itself in the case of Somalia. Using the juridical state of Somalia as the object of analysis without looking under the surface becomes a serious hindrance of capturing the full picture. Somalia’s image problem As Michael C. Williams (2003, 527) excellently points out, “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics”. In this context we can identify the visualization of the verbal rhetoric of the failed state paradigm. The presentation of ”failed states” is often accompanied with depictions of a war-torn hell-hole, and the Foreign Policy Magazine takes the lead by presenting the Failed States Index together with a collection of photos appearing under the splash heading: “Postcards from Hell” (Foreign Policy Magazine 2011). When the Failed States Index is referred to by other news outlets, this kind of presentation is reproduced (for a recent example, see: BBC 2011a). I have yet to see an example of any media organization to examine the Index more closely. Only telling one side of the story is a serious problem. We can compare the use of the “failed state” label with how Somalia is depicted in the daily media coverage. How many times can you remember to have seen the pictures from Somalia, the disaster zone, with starving children, heavily armed Islamist fighters and dead people being dragged through the streets by a cheering mob? Quite a few times, I suppose. On the other hand, how many times have you seen pictures from Somalia showing farmers working in their fields, smiling and playful children, or the beach in Mogadishu crowded with both men, women and children? Probably not at all. Of course, the pictures of the disaster zone of Somalia are real and by every journalistic standard it is right to publish such pictures. The practice becomes a problem when these are the only pictures that are being shown, when the stories about starving children and dangerous terrorists are the only stories that are being told about Somalia outside Somalia. This misrepresentation in the media can for a large part be attributed to the “failed state” label that is burn-marked on the country, and which pay so little attention to the variations within the geographical area that makes up the state of Somalia. When a statement is repeated enough times, it becomes a “truth”. Politicians and scholars, as well as the media itself are responsible for this brand marking, and the process is self-reinforcing. The situation has reached the point where members of the Somali diaspora community in Norway has established an organization with one of its main goals to adjust the picture that has been made of Somalia and the Somali people (Iftiin – somalisk-norsk kunnskapssenter 2011). Somalia has a serious image-problem – literally. Not only does this put the country in risk of external intervention, it also contributes to keep Somalia and much of its population in the margins of international relations. There is a lack of representation of the people inhabiting the territory of the Somali Republic, both because the TFG lacks authority, but also because of the non-recognition of the de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland. Here we have to functional geopolitical entities that are not represented in the UN nor in other global or regional institutions. Furthermore foreign investors and tourists stay away because of the perception and understanding of the whole of Somalia being a ”failed state”. Africaand the Knowledge of Non-Being In his classic work Orientalism, Edward Said (2003 [1978]) scrutinize the history and nature of Western attitudes towards the East. He argues that orientalism is a powerful European ideological creation and a way for dealing with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs. Achille Mbembe applies much of the same argumentation in his critique of Africanism. He says that historically, the West has constructed its own civilization, enlightenment and progress through the “others”, thus non-Western cultures, and especially Africa. Mbembe argues that: “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and still continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Mbembe 2001, 2). One of the challenges in grasping how things work outside the Western world is that many, if not even all, of the concepts we use when describing the universe of International Relations is based in Western history and thinking. Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber et al. 1991, 78). In Western thinking, Weber’s definition represents the *idea* of an “ideal state”, and it seems like many have the perception that Western states fit into this idea or norm. When analyzing states in Africa, this is revealed when African states are compared with the *idea* of an “ideal state”, which is believed to be a prototype of a Western state – leading to the focus on African states’ absences, lacks and incompleteness, as weak or failed. In this way Mbembe’s analysis is straight to the point when he states that “while we feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies, and economies *are not*, we still know absolutely nothing about *what they actually are*”. Our knowledge of Africa is to a large degree based on the knowledge of non-being (Mbembe 2001, 9). But claiming that the “Western state” resembles the Weberian state, or even that the “Western state” is the norm, is highly problematic. First of all, every state has its own specific features, and the higher the degree of generalization, the more problematic it is. Secondly, Weber’s state is an idea of a state that has never existed in practice – even not in Europe or North America – for example when we take into account the important fact that private violence and private security has existed through modern history, and even today. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010), Colás & Mabee (2010) and Thomson (1994) are among several scholars who have demonstrated how private violence and private security takes form in e.g. private companies, criminal organizations and vigilante groups. If the states in Europe and North America are to be judged by the same standards as the states in Africa, many of these could get the “failed” label as well. Noam Chomsky, for example, has turned the tables in his book “Failed States”, where he shows that the US shares features with other “failed states” (2007). But does the “failed state” label provide us with more and better insight into how different states work; does it enlighten us in any way? Definitely not. The label conceals more than it enlightens. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010) argues that we must look beyond the state when analysing security issues in Africa. I would argue that we must look both beyond and within the state also when we want to analyse states in Africa, and especially Somalia.

The spectral threat of nuclear war is itself part of a system of deterrence which neutralizes all events, including the real possibility of nuclear war. This is an implosive violence; the balance of terror is the terror of balance. That all things must be quilted through the nuclear issue marks its function as a simulacrum to conceal the death of politics

Baudrillard 81 (Jean Baudrillard, ask Jack, “Simulacra and Simulation,” pp 32-4)

The apotheosis of simulation: the nuclear. However, the balance of terror is never ¶ anything but the spectacular slope of a system of deterrence that has insinuated itself ¶ from the inside into all the cracks of daily life. Nuclear suspension only serves to seal the ¶ trivialized system of deterrence that is at the heart of the media, of the violence without ¶ consequences that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory apparatus of all the ¶ choices that are made for us. The most insignificant of our behaviors is regulated by ¶ neutralized, indifferent, equivalent signs, by zero-sum signs like those that regulate the ¶ "strategy of games" (but the true equation is elsewhere, and the unknown is precisely that ¶ variable of simulation which makes of the atomic arsenal itself a hyperreal form, a ¶ simulacrum that dominates everything and reduces all "ground-level" events to being ¶ nothing but ephemeral scenarios, transforming the life left us into survival, into a stake ¶ without stakes - not even into a life insurance policy: into a policy that already has no ¶ value). ¶ It is not the direct threat of atomic destruction that paralyzes our lives, it is deterrence ¶ that gives them leukemia. And this deterrence comes from that fact that even the real ¶ atomic clash is precluded - precluded like the eventuality of the real in a system of signs. ¶ The whole world pretends to believe in the reality of this threat (this is understandable on ¶ the part of the military, the gravity of their exercise and the discourse of their "strategy" ¶ are at stake), but it is precisely at this level that there are no strategic stakes. The whole ¶ originality of the situation lies in the improbability of destruction.¶ Deterrence precludes war - the archaic violence of expanding systems. Deterrence itself ¶ is the neutral, implosive violence of metastable systems or systems in involution. There is ¶ no longer a subject of deterrence, nor an adversary nor a strategy - it is a planetary ¶ structure of the annihilation of stakes. Atomic war, like the Trojan War, will not take ¶ place. The risk of nuclear annihilation only serves as a pretext, through the sophistication ¶ of weapons (a sophistication that surpasses any possible objective to such an extent that it ¶ is itself a symptom of nullity), for installing a universal security system, a universal ¶ lockup and control system whose deterrent effect is not at all aimed at an atomic clash ¶ (which was never in question, except without a doubt in the very initial stages of the cold ¶ war, when one still confused the nuclear apparatus with conventional war) but, rather, at ¶ the much greater probability of any real event, of anything that would be an event in the ¶ general system and upset its balance. The balance of terror is the terror of balance.¶ Deterrence is not a strategy, it circulates and is exchanged between nuclear protagonists ¶ exactly as is international capital in the orbital zone of monetary speculation whose ¶ fluctuations suffice to control all global exchanges. Thus the money of destruction ¶ (without any reference to real destruction, any more than floating capital has a real ¶ referent of production) that circulates in nuclear orbit suffices to control all the violence ¶ and potential conflicts around the world.¶ What is hatched in the shadow of this mechanism with the pretext of a maximal, ¶ "objective," threat, and thanks to Damocles' nuclear sword, is the perfection of the best ¶ system of control that has ever existed. And the progressive satellization of the whole ¶ planet through this hypermodel of security.¶ The same goes for peaceful nuclear power stations. Pacification does not distinguish ¶ between the civil and the military: everywhere where irreversible apparatuses of control ¶ are elaborated, everywhere where the notion of security becomes omnipotent, ¶ everywhere where the norm replaces the old arsenal of laws and violence (including ¶ war), it is the system of deterrence that grows, and around it grows the historical, social, ¶ and political desert. A gigantic involution that makes every conflict, every finality, every ¶ confrontation contract in proportion to this blackmail that interrupts, neutralizes, freezes ¶ them all. No longer can any revolt, any story be deployed according to its own logic ¶ because it risks annihilation. No strategy is possible any longer, and escalation is only a ¶ puerile game given over to the military. The political stake is dead, only simulacra of ¶ conflicts and carefully circumscribed stakes remain.

# 2NC

## Framework

Situatedness determines political efficacy

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

4. Their framework causes passivity

Antonio 95 (Robert J Antonio, PhD in sociology, professor of sociology at the University of Kansas, July 1995, “Nietzsche’s Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History,” *American Journal of Sociology* Volume 101 Number 1, GENDER MODIFIED)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass disci- pline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, ef- fecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, ap- pearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "re- markable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83).¶ The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?¶ A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others."¶ Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great ~~man~~ [person] of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

**Framing determines the outcomes of policy – uniquely true in the context of security**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizi

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**Footnoting DA**

**Der Derian 95** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

**Sequencing DA**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: *War against the Other*, p. 31)

<This chapter remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that potentially lie beyond. This is another project, one whose contours are already becoming clearer and which I address in detail in Chapters 2 and 3.16 What this chapter builds is a genealogical account of security's origins and cultural power, its ability to provide what Walker calls a 'constitutive account of the political’ – as he says, 'claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modern politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship'.17 Before we can rewrite security we have to properly understand how security has written us – how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships and our available images of political, social and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our 'humanity' and a secure identity defined and limited by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.>

## Link Debate

**violence inevitable**

**Cuomo 96** – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

**Bush-style whitewashing of mass violence**

**Porotsky 13** (Sophia Porotsky, MA honors candidate in international relations at the University of St Andrews, April 26th, 2013, “Pax Americana: The Successful Securitization of the Triple Threat of Terrorism, “Outlaw” Regimes, and Weapons of Mass Destruction,” http://www.academia.edu/3482477/Pax\_Americana\_The\_Successful\_Securitization\_of\_the\_Triple\_Threat\_of\_Terrorism\_Outlaw\_Regimes\_and\_Weapons\_of\_Mass\_Destruction) gz

Transforming the semantics of an act involves “replacing unpleasant reality with desirable rhetoric, gilding the frame so that the real picture is disguised” (Zimbardo, 2009: 273). The use of sanitizing or euphemistic language is ubiquitous in the government texts. For example, Bush declares: ¶ “We will use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to build an atmosphere of international order and openness in which progress and liberty can flourish in many nations. A peaceful world of growing freedom serves American long-term interests, reflects enduring American ideals, and unites America’s allies. We defend this peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes” (Bush, 2002d).¶ In this excerpt Bush cloaks military action with euphemistic statements such as ‘building an atmosphere of international order and openness’ and ‘defending the peace,’ he sanitizes the means by accentuating the morally justifiable ends of ‘peace’, ‘order’, and ‘openness’. Tapping into the political myth of American Exceptionalism, Bush justifies the end goal by framing it as a cause for the greater good of the world. Bandura expands on the effects of sanitizing language and euphemistic labeling stating:¶ “Language shapes thought patterns on which actions are based. Activities can take on very different appearances depending on what they are called…euphemistic language is widely used to make harmful conduct respectable and to reduce personal responsibility for it…people behave much more cruelly when assaultive actions are verbally sanitized than when they are called aggression” (Bandura, 1999: 195). ¶ This statement substantiates the claim that adopting a particular discourse when describing violent action disguises the true meaning of the act, while simultaneously reinforcing the justifications from the War on Terrorism narrative. A further example can be found in Bush’s Address to the Nation where he asserts:¶ “These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations…Our military action is also designed to clear the way for sustained, comprehensive and relentless operations to drive them out and bring them to justice…As we strike military targets, we’ll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan” (Bush, 2001k).¶ Describing military actions as ‘carefully targeted’ implies that the army is striking only military targets with surgical precision; it encourages people to overlook any ‘collateral damage,’ a euphemism for civilian casualties, in the process. Additionally, Bush excuses the implicit collateral damage by demonstrating the benevolence of the United States. Dropping humanitarian aid compensates for the consequences of military action. Bush then reinforces the benevolent image of the United States by tapping into discourses of women and children and suffering, assigning the role of savior of the Afghan people to the United States. The altered semantics of this act is revealed upon a comparison of the reality on the ground versus the narrative Bush was constructing. While Bush claimed that the military campaign in Afghanistan was ‘carefully targeted’ and ‘precise,’ in reality the military was carpet bombing Afghanistan using cluster bombs (Lee, 2005: 279). Carpet bombing can be understood as “the progressive distribution of a mass bomb load upon an area…in such a manner as to inflict damage to all portions within the boundaries” (Keane, 2005: 30). Thus, carpet bombing by definition is indiscriminate, the polar opposite of ‘carefully targeted’ or ‘precise.’ Moreover, cluster bombs “disperse large numbers of explosive submunitions over wide areas and often fail to explode immediately, leaving a long-term legacy of explosive contamination” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). Cluster bombs in particular have provoked international criticism due to their “unique characteristics that make them a grave danger to civilian men, women and children… causing high civilian casualties especially when they are used in populated areas… Many thousands of civilians have been tragically killed and injured by coming into contact with unexploded submunitions” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009). Thus, the narrative Bush was constructing could not be further from the reality. While Bush was highlighting the benevolence and good will of the US, the US military was inflicting the maximum amount of indiscriminate damage. Ironically, the humanitarian aid packages Bush was referring to were the same bright yellow color as the unexploded cluster bomblets (Lee, 2005: 279), further endangering civilians who could easily mistake the submunitions for food or medicine. Bush obscuring the sordid realities and stressing the good will of the US contributes to moral justification, which is essential for the American public acceptance of securitization. Moral justifications are a requisite of moral disengagement, since these justifications are the basis on which morally reprehensible acts are perpetrated.

**Their so called benign hegemonic strategy legitimizes a series of self-fulfilling prophecies in which any nation that steps outside of the globalized order is destroyed**

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28. The hegemonic strategy of the United States is articulated on the collective character of new imperialism and to the profit of the insufficiencies and weaknesses of the “antineoliberal” social and political movements. 29. This strategy, barely recognized by the “proAmerican” defenders, is, in the dominant discourse, the object of two “soft” propositions, not quite real, but operational, from the point of view of our opponent. The first is that this hegemony belongs to a “gentle” leadership, sometimes knows as “benign hegemony” by the democratic fraction of the American establishment. Through this mix of false naivety and real hypocrisy, this discourse pretends that the United States only acts in the interests of the peoples who are associated with the triad, motivated by the same “democratic” pulses, and even the interests of the rest of the world, to whom globalization offers the chance of “development”, reinforced by the benefits of democracy

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that American powers promote everywhere, as we know. The second is that, in all domains, the Unites States benefit from enormous advantages  whether it be economic, scientific, political, military or cultural that legitimize their hegemony. In fact, American hegemony works from logic, and a system, that has little to do with the discourse it envelops. 30. The objectives of this hegemony have been proclaimed, and adhered to in innumerable productions from the US leaders (unfortunately, little read by its victims). After the fall of the USSR  their only potential military adversary  the US establishment evaluates that it has a period of about 20 years to put into place its global hegemony and reduce to nothingness the possibilities of its potential “rivals”, not that they are necessarily capable of an alternative hegemony, just capable of affirming their autonomy in a global system that would be “nonhegemonic”  in my language, a multicentric system. These “rivals” are of course Europe (we no longer hear talks about a Japan hegemony !), but also Russia and most of all China, the principal designated adversary that Washington may have to envision destroying (militarily) if she continues to persist in her “development” and a certain independent will. Other rivals have also been noted, in fact, all Southern countries that may develop a resistance to the exigencies of globalized neoliberalism  India or Brazil, Iran or South Africa. 31. The objectives are therefore to vassalize the allies in the triad, to make them incapable of effective global initiatives, and to destroy the “large countries”, always by nature too “big” (the United States being the only one with right to be so). Dismantle Russia after the USSR, dismantle China, India, even Brazil; instrumentalising the weaknesses of each country’s power systems, manipulate the former States of the USSR, and stroke the centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, support the Muslims of Xinjiang and the Tibetan monks, feeding the conflict with the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, intervening in the Amazon (Plan Colombia), etc.

## A2: Neolib Good

We control uniqueness

Dr. Ronn Pineo, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, and Professor and Chair of the Department of History at Towson University – Posted on April 11, 2013- See more at: http://www.coha.org/22227/#sthash.L5CsywQs.dpuf

Poverty in Latin America has been reduced substantially in the last three decades. In the late 1980s, nearly half of Latin America’s population lived in poverty. Today the fraction is about a third. [21] This marks important progress, and it has continued in some area nations. However, it is worth noting that between 2002 and 2008, poverty contracted most in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Argentina, countries which had largely **abandoned neoliberalism**; in Brazil, which had at least partially rejected neoliberalism; and in only two other states, Honduras and Perú, which still remained, at least partially, committed to free market polices. [22] It was mostly factors **beyond economic policy** that helps to account for recent declines in the rate of Latin American poverty. One factor was increasing remittances from Latin Americans laboring in the developed world, especially in the United States. Total remittances from Latin American workers rose from $12 billion USD in 1995, to $45 billion in 2004, and $68 billion in 2006. [23] However, “by far the main contributor to the reduction in the poverty rate,” as Jaime Ros has noted, was “the fall in the dependency ratio.” [24] The indicator measures the number of non-working age people—children and the elderly—who are supported by the working age population. The higher the dependency number, the greater the economic burden. Source: foreignpolicyblogs.com Latin America’s past demographic history underlies this shift in the dependency ratio. The late 1940s in Latin America witnessed lower overall death rates (the number of people who died a year divided by the total population), especially due to lower infant and childhood mortality rates. Initially, birth rates stayed high even as death rates fell, but after a generation passed Latin America’s birth rates began to drift downward to match the lower death rates. The time gap between the fall in death rates beginning in the late 1940s and the eventual fall in birth rates by the late 1970s resulted in an unprecedented population explosion. Latin America’s population rose from 167 million in 1950 to 285 million by 1970. As this population cohort has aged, Latin America’s dependency ratio fell too, dropping from a very high rate of 87.3 in the years 1965-1970, to 55.0 for 2005-2010, an all-time low for the region. The people born during the population explosion are of working age now, bringing the region a historic but one-time economic advantage, the “demographic bonus” or “demographic dividend.” As a result, Latin America temporarily enjoys a situation of a very large number of workers providing for a greatly reduced number of dependent people. The region’s demographic bonus means that there is, for the moment, less poverty due, in large part, to the increased number of working age people per household. [25] A drop in the dependency ratio carries with it greater female participation in the workforce, for lower fertility means there are fewer children to care for, freeing women to enter the paid workforce. Lower fertility also means better overall lifetime health for women, resulting in more years spent in the paid workforce for adult females. The fertility rate (the number of children born per woman per year) fell in Latin America from 5.6 for the years from 1965 to1970, to 2.4 for the years 2005 to 2010. The resulting demographic bonus has provided a significant, but fleeting, economic asset. By 2025, as the current population ages, Latin America will need to support a very large elderly dependent population. [26] It is fair to conclude that the reduction of poverty in Latin America in recent years was produced mainly by some short-term victories in the commodity lottery (as explained in Part I, the commodity lottery refers to short-term price rises for selected raw material exports), as well as a spike in remittances, and most of all, a one-time reduction in the dependency ratio. Income inequality data for Latin America is less positive. In the 1980s and 1990s, inequality increased significantly in Latin America. For example, from 1984 to 1994, the income of the top 10 percent of the Mexico’s population rose by 21 percent, while the income of the country’s bottom 10 percent fell by 23 percent. Nevertheless, there have been improvements, albeit modest ones, in lowering the Gini coefficient (a measure of economic inequality with 0 being the least inequality—everyone has the same income, and 1.0 being the most inequality—one person has all the income). Source: norlarnet.uio.no From 2002 to 2008, the Gini coefficient improved in seven Latin American states; five of these seven countries—Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Paraguay—have traveled the farthest in rejecting neoliberalism. Outside of these nations inequality stayed the same or even increased, including in the largely neoliberal states of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Latin Americans earned 363 times more than the poorest 1 percent. By 1995, it was 417 times more. Latin America continues to show, by far, the greatest income inequality of any region in the world. Of the 15 most unequal economies in the world today, 10 are in the area. If Latin America’s income were only as unevenly distributed as that of Eastern Europe or South Asia, its recent economic growth, though sometimes anemic, would have reduced the percentage of those living in poverty to 3 percent of the population. [27] The Economist, in its 2010 review of the Latin American economic situation, concluded that the region was “well on the way to building middle-class societies.” [28] The evidence, however, contradicts this assertion. The informal sector—where people arrange irregular employment in itinerant retail sales, as day workers, or other loosely arranged jobs—today accounts for more than half of all workers in Latin America. More than eight of ten new jobs in Latin America are in the informal sector. [29] Informal sector workers enjoy no protective regulation or benefits. They live by their wits, striving to scratch out a living, day by day. Meanwhile, union membership among active workers in Latin America fell from around one-fourth in the 1980s to under one-sixth in the 1990s. Source: laht.com Moreover, significant areas of severe poverty remain in Latin America, expressed along class, racial, gender, and regional divides Poverty underlies poor health, contributing to elevated rates of infant, childhood, and maternal mortality. Of those living in poverty in Latin America, nearly half are children. Due to their undernourishment, a quarter of Latin American children (and as many as half in rural Perú and Guatemala) are stunted in their development. Across Latin America malnutrition is an underlying cause in more than half of the deaths of children under the age of five. In Guatemala maternal mortality among indigenous women is 83 percent higher than the national average. Among the poorest fifth of the Perú’s population, 85 percent of births are not attended by trained personnel, compared to only 4 percent among the wealthiest fifth. Two-thirds of Latin American municipalities do not treat their sewage prior to dumping it into adjacent rivers or the sea. In Panamá, three in ten homes lack access to improved sanitation (sewage disposal), and in Perú, nearly four in ten lack this essential service. Yet with all this effluvium flowing out, still three-quarters of Latin America municipalities do not check public drinking water supplies for impurities. One-quarter of Latin Americans do not have in-home potable water. [30] In Latin America nearly two-thirds of hospital admissions are due to diseases related to the lack of sanitation. Diarrhea accounts for six of every ten deaths of children under the age of five in Latin America. Fresh water can save lives; for each percentage point increase in potable water coverage, the infant mortality rate drops 1 death per 1,000 live births. Yet, Latin America is falling behind in terms of life expectancy. Life expectancy in Latin America was five years longer than East Asia in the mid-1960s, but by the mid-1990s, it was 1.2 years shorter. [31] The weight of this evidence leads to an inescapable conclusion. Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has put it most succinctly, “Over the last three decades, economists…provid[ed]…theoretical justifications for financial deregulation and the unrestrained pursuit of short-term profits…[T]hey advanced theories that justified the policies that have led to slower growth…[and] higher inequality…[**E]conomics has been worse than irrelevant. Economics, as it has been practiced in the last three decades, has been positively harmful for most people**.” [32] The Twilight of Neoliberalism “There is no alternative [to free market policies],” the late British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher once pronounced, but across Latin America, there has been a steady erosion of support for the free market model. At present three-quarters of Latin America governments can be fairly characterized as being governed by center-left or left-oriented leaders. Moreover, there has been a far-reaching reassessment of the relevance of IMF advice, especially after the organization’s punishingly controversial response to the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. The Asian economic meltdown brought the reflexive recommendations from the IMF in the form of harsh austerity measures. However, the pro-cyclical policies demanded by the IMF of its client states so plainly worsened the economic situation and needlessly caused considerable human misery that the IMF’s reputation was badly damaged. In the wake of IMF’s subsequent mishandling of the 1998 economic crises in Russia and Brazil, large private lenders, especially among the European ones, stopped requiring IMF assurances that borrowing nations follow neoliberal strictures. As Richard Peet has noted, “the…[IMF]’s reputation has never recovered, even in circles that the Fund values. [...] The power of the IMF has been reduced by failed crisis management, [with] countries paying up as quickly as possible and distancing themselves” from the IMF. [33] European lenders concluded that new loans to non-neoliberal Latin American states would perform handsomely, which, in fact, they have. The IMF’s power to impose neoliberal policies on debtor nations has been seriously compromised. Source: herslookingatyousquid.worldpress.com Argentina, following its severe economic crisis in 2001-2002, proved that a nation could successfully challenge the IMF. Argentina defaulted on its $100 billion USD foreign debt and renegotiated its obligations, paying off its loans at a fraction of the original cost. Buenos Aires finished retiring its debt to the IMF in 2005, benefitting greatly from Venezuelan assistance. In offering the money, the late Hugo Chávez promised that, “if additional help is needed to help Argentina finally free itself from the claws of the International Monetary Fund, Argentina can count on us.” [34] Other Latin American nations looked on as Argentina defied the IMF, and continued to watch as Argentina’s economy soared, growing faster than any other nation in the Western Hemisphere after it abandoned IMF-imposed economic policies. Soon a stampede of those flouting IMF mandates followed, with each new defection providing courage to all those nations rejecting neoliberalism. Other international lenders appeared as well. Venezuela loaned money to other countries in the region, including Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, but only if they ignored the counsel of the IMF. The Bank of the South, established in 2007, joined Venezuela with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay as an alternative source for credit. China, which does not particularly care what the IMF recommends, is also supplying capital. Furthermore, some primary commodity export prices have increased, in part due to the demand for Chinese imports (for example, Argentine soya). This has allowed several Latin American states to build up their financial reserves, making new foreign borrowing less pressing. Today the IMF can coerce only the most feeble economies, mainly now in sub-Sahara Africa. The political landscape has shifted too. By the late 1990s, many of the aging left-wing political parties built around organized labor had been flattened by the assault on unions mounted under neoliberalism. At first voters were willing to give candidates who supported the neoliberal program a chance; nevertheless, as it became increasingly clear that these policies were failing, those who spoke out against neoliberalism were elected in growing numbers. The trouble was that once in office they too often carried out neoliberal programs anyway, as for example with Abdalá Bucaram (1996-1997) or Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005) in Ecuador, either because they secretly favored such policies, because the IMF persuaded them to do so, or both. With the traditional left-leaning parties marginalized in several countries and the abandonment of anti-neoliberal promises by elected politicians, ordinary citizens had to develop new political methods to defend themselves. Neoliberal policies so savaged the working class, as well as the urban marginalized and the hard-pressed peasantry, that they had no choice but to organize and fight back. To this end, they created new organizations and, in some cases, used them to seize power. By pressing the neoliberal agenda, the Latin American élites appeared to have overplayed their hand, and they paid for it by losing control of governments that they had controlled for many years, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond. A 2009 Latinobarómetro Survey found that support for democracy (as preferable to all other forms of government) was the strongest in countries that flatly rejected neoliberalism. Of the top five nations in popular support of democracy, four were governed by progressive leaders: Venezuela, Bolivia, Uruguay, and El Salvador. [35] Hope for the Future? Supporters of the free market approach have continued to counsel patience. They argue that stronger economic growth will eventually come, and that all will benefit in the long run. While neoliberal reforms might cause some short-term belt tightening, defenders explain that such adjustments, though sometimes painful, are necessary for the greatest good. We should not give in to “reform fatigue,” but should stay the course. [36] But neoliberal policies have been in place for over 30 years now. How long is the long run? How long must we wait? As John Maynard Keynes famously observed, “In the long run we are all dead.” In 1937 U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt observed, “We have always known that heedless self-interest was bad morals. We know now that it is bad economics.” [37] The age of neoliberalism is ending. It is time for some good economics.

## A2: Lifton nonsense

**Learn how to read**

**Lifton 11** (Robert Jay Lifton, not an aff author, 2011, “Witness to an Extreme Century: A Memoir,” pp 405-7) gz

With all of the American angst during the first year or so of the Obama administration, one may readily forget the power of the historical moment of his election in 2008. BJ and I had a few friends in to watch the returns on the sleek television set in our living room, which we had purchased four years earlier for a similar gathering that had resulted in a roomful of despair and suspicion of fraud in relation to the Bush victory. But this time, in 2008, the television set did not betray us, and my reaction of not just joy but ecstasy, including tears, was hardly mine alone. What was special to me, though, was the quick realization that the outcome meant an end to the country's superpower syndrome. But was that the case? Only partly, it turns out. Certainly Obama and his administration have renounced the principle of American omnipotence in favor of more modest claims about our capacities and influence in the world. Apocalypticism and totalistic behavior have given way to something closer to Camus's "philosophy of limits" with an acceptance of ambiguity, nuance, and complexity. And most important, there has been a specific rejection of nuclearism and a call for abolition of the weapons.¶ Yet despite all that, **the syndrome lingers** in crucial areas that specifically connect with my work. Concerning nuclear abolition, Obama has not followed through with clear American policies, despite an impressive convocation of world leaders on the subject of nuclear danger. On revelations of torture, and more recently of illegitimate medical experiments in relation to torture, Obama has mostly tried to sidestep the issue and avoid legal culpability of those involved. Finally, his decision to send added troops to Afghanistan seems to me to be the stuff of war-making, and atrocity-producing, blunder. In all three cases there is a certain clinging to the very American omnipotence being renounced. I have found myself torn between joining a considerable segment of the left in a condemnation of shortcomings that perpetuate elements of the superpower syndrome, and an alternative inclination to defend Obama as an incremental reformer who needs more time.¶ I took the latter position in a series of discussions with Howard Zinn, who denounced Obama as "a Chicago politician" and a hypocrite. I still don't agree with that judgment but I am also willing to take a public stand of strong opposition to Obama policies on Afghanistan and on American torture and recently revealed experimentation. Yet I remain sensitive as well to the importance of supporting the Obama administration in the face of new waves of right-wing American totalism and potential violence in the backlash over the election of our first African-American president.¶ I have a feeling that if one lives long enough one can be witness to just about every variation of American domestic and foreign policy, good and bad. What I can best do, I believe, is to **sustain a critique** of **residual features** of the superpower syndrome, always connected with work I have done in areas that have contributed to that syndrome.

**This is a reason to reject the team – their argument feeds into the systems of domination endemic to Obama’s presidency – vote neg to reject their masking of mass imperialism**

**Comissiong 13** (Solomon Comissiong, educator, activist, public speaker, founder of the Your World News community media collective, member of the Black Agenda Report, 5-11-13, “The More Effective Evil: The Impact of Barack Obama’s Presidency on the Black Community,” transcribed from video, 0:20-2:40, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=i-LAJSlO3GU>) gz

Since becoming the US’s first black president in 2008, Barack Obama has proven to be a proverbial God-sent for Wall Street bankers, the military industrial complex, and US imperialism. His domestic policies have been an affront to the so-called middle class, the working poor, and people of color. His race to the top educational scheme is essentially George Bush’s No Child Left Behind on steroids; firing teachers and shutting down schools in black and Latino communities, all the while, making room for corporate control charter schools. Barack Obama has not offered a single targeted plan to mitigate the enormous gap between blacks and whites caused by American-style institutional racism. Obama won’t even utter the words “institutional” “racism” side by side. President Obama’s impact has been devastating on the overall conscience of a great many African Americans. Historically, African Americans have been amongst the most progress demographics in the US, however, since Obama’s political ascension, that history is becoming more and more distant.

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Obama has popularized America’s imperialist wars throughout the African American community. These wars have historically been protested and resisted by African Americans; however, that is ostensibly no longer the case. As recently as the mid-2000s, African Americans were openly protesting the Bush administration’s imperialist wars and crimes against humanity. Since becoming president, Barack Obama has expanded the theatre of war in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia. He then bombed Libya into oblivion while financing terrorist rebels that committed heinous atrocities, especially on anyone who is black and a supporter of Muammar Gaddafi. Obama predicated the bombing of Libya on a blatant array of outright lies and, as usual, the American people consumed this trough of lies fed to them by the corporate media and the White House. Unfortunately, most African Americans have either kept silent in the face of Obama’s warmongering and crimes against humanity or they have outright supported it while making excuses for the war criminal, Obama. The combination of Obama being brown and a Democrat made him the white establishment’s perfect weapon to pacify the black community.

# 1NR

## International Credibility

The affirmative’s discourse of North Korean aggression creates a geopolitical Dr Evil irrationally attempting to destroy the world – these problematic representations inflicts mass structural violence on North Korean civilians, marked as “cannibals,” “baby-killers,” and “drones” and justifies international coercion, forcing threat actualization

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-13-13, “Western Media Set Up North Korea for War,” http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/13/western-media-set-up-north-korea-for-war/) gz

Western so-called news media coverage of the escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula is like watching a cross between a bad James Bond movie and a cheap horror flick about flesh-eating zombies. It would be funny if the danger of war was not so serious and imminent. The disturbing direction of the Western media coverage is to set up North Korea – a poor impoverished country – for an all-out military attack by the world’s nuclear superpower psychopath – the United States. Paradoxically, this danger is being incited by “news” corporations that pompously claim to be free-thinking bastions of independent journalism, when in reality they are nothing more than progenitors of the worst kind of pulp fiction. Kim Jong-un, the young leader of North Korea who took over from his late father in 2011, is being cast as an insane villain whose Western media persona resembles that of a putative Doctor Evil. His projected character is fit for a role in an early 007 movie. Days ago, Kim was reported as threatening “preemptive nuclear war” against South Korea and its patron the United States. How evil! Scarcely mentioned were the facts that Kim was forced into this position of making a staunch defense of his country, under immense pressure of relentless imperialist aggression. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been slapped with yet more US-led sanctions aimed at ostracizing the country from any international contact. It’s the equivalent of solitary confinement of a prisoner, subjected to sensory deprivation. But this is torture of an entire nation with no reprieve. Yes, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear weapons test in mid-February. This was after the US tightened the thumb-screws with yet more sanctions; and after years of Washington refusing to reciprocate with a negotiated settlement to end more than six decades of crippling trade embargoes in addition to the ever-present threat of nuclear annihilation against North Korea following the 1950-53 war with its American-backed Southern neighbor. No other country has been threatened with nuclear Armageddon as often as North Korea – and always by the US – for more than 60 years. Western media have now highlighted the North Korean leader ordering his massed troops to prepare for “wiping out” a South Korean island by turning a craggy maritime outpost into “a sea of flames.” Do you see the innuendo here? Wiping out an island? Well, Kim must be an insane megalomaniac, right? The island in question is the disputed territory of Baengnyeong, which is actually located off the North Korean mainland, but which the US forced into South Korea’s possession following the 1950-53 war. It has been used since, provocatively, as a staging post for American surveillance and forward planning for attack against North Korea. No doubt the island will be used this week during the US perennial war planning maneuvers that simulate the invasion of North Korea, but which Washington euphemistically calls “defensive measures.” Befitting the caricature of arch-villain, photographs and footage have abounded in Western media showing Kim Jong-un clad in black long overcoat and black gloves, peering through binoculars apparently towards South Korean and American forces across the Demilitarized Zone of the 38th parallel. Just in case the Western public fail to pick up on the demonic Dr Evil caricature, there is another sub-plot being instilled – the North Korean flesh-eating zombies. In recent weeks, there has been a rash of stories regurgitated by the same Western media of outbreaks of cannibalism among the allegedly starving people of North Korea. These stories of cannibalistic gore and nihilism have not just been printed by the voyeuristic tabloid gutter press. They have also been published prominently by supposed quality outlets, such as Britain’s*Sunday Times* and *Independent*, as well as one of America’s paper of record, *The Washington Post*. Significantly, these macabre stories began circulating in Western media outlets at the end of January – some two weeks before North Korea conducted its underground nuclear explosion. That suggests that the flesh-eating horror claims in North Korea are the work of a Western intel psychological campaign aimed at adding pejorative technicolor to the present crisis. It makes for difficult reading. Not because of the alleged gruesome details, but because these stories are so obviously concocted and regurgitated in reflex manner by supposed news organizations. The horror claims all come from one source: allegedly an undercover team of journalists from an outfit called the Asia Press, based in Japan, who were allegedly spirited secretly into North Korea and allegedly interviewed various anonymous farmers and Communist party officials. It’s so bad you could not make it up. Yet the Western media presses have gone into overdrive to pump out these unconfirmed and unverifiable accounts of purported bloodcurdling cannibalism among the North Korean population. In one version published by Britain’s *Daily Mail*, the headline runs, “North Korean parents ‘eating their own children’ after being driven mad by hunger in famine-hit pariah state.” Daily Mail readers are told of how starving adults are kidnapping and murdering children. One man was allegedly executed by firing squad after his wife found out that he had killed their young daughter and son “while she was away on business;” when she returned to the starving family homestead her husband greeted her with the welcome news that “they had meat” to eat. In another ghoulish tale, printed as serious news, an elderly man is reported to have dug up the graves of his grandchildren and eaten their rotten flesh. The truly disturbing thing about these reports is that not only are they sordid sensationalism passed off as credible reports by supposedly serious news organizations, but worse is that this propaganda is apparently believed by droves of the Western public who read or watch such media. Check out some of the readers’ comments below the stories printed in the above mentioned media and you will find all sorts of denunciations of North Korea and its “sick people.” But it’s not the people of North Korea who are depraved: it’s the Western media and their gullible subscribers who indulge in this odious character assassination of an entire nation. The Western media coverage of North Korea recalls stories of babies being ripped from hospital incubators by Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait, which was a crucial tipping point for Western public opinion to support the American-led war on Iraq in 1991. More than a decade later, the same Western media ran scare stories of weapons of mass destruction that paved the way of the American genocide in Iraq from 2003-2012. The same Western propaganda press repeats endless claims about “sinister Iranian nuclear ambitions” that serve to justify a criminal American-led trade embargo on Iran that may result in a US/Israeli military attack on the Islamic Republic. The same Western propaganda press is now doing the same hatchet job on North Korea. A nation of flesh-eating zombies led by an evil personality cult who wants to blow up islands? “Yeah, go on Chuck, nuke those mothers!” The Western public are being played like fools to go along with the most depraved behaviour of military barbarism – a nuclear superpower itching to destroy an impoverished nation that threatens no-one. Truly, Western imperialist reality is more perverse and sick than the Western fiction.

No Korean war – laundry list (rational regime, empirics, military inferiority, and it’s all just domestic propaganda)

Fisher ‘13 Max, Foreign Policy Writer @ Washington Post & Former Editor at the Atlantic, “Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won’t follow through)” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/03/12/why-north-korea-loves-to-threaten-world-war-iii-but-probably-wont-follow-through/

North Korea is indeed a dangerous rogue state that has, in the recent past, staged small-scale but deadly attacks on South Korea without provocation. In March 2010, a South Korean navy ship was attacked by a ship of unknown origin, killing 46 on board; though North Korea denied responsibility, an investigation concluded it was likely responsible. A few months later, North Korea fired over 100 artillery shells at Yeonpyeong Island, killing two civilians and wounding 19.¶ But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching “all-out war,” a mad dog of East Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has also shown itself to be **shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own self-preservation**. The regime’s past behavior **suggests pretty strongly** that these **threats are empty**. But they still matter.¶ **For years**, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We can’t read Kim Jong Eun’s mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics, with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war.¶ Starting World War III or a second Korean War would not serve any of Pyongyang’s interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldn’t last long against a U.S.-led counterattack. No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost **certainly end with the regime’s total destruction**.¶ Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyang’s interests, even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Il’s death that Kim had made up for North Korea’s weakness with canny belligerence:¶ The shtick of apparent madness flowed from his country’s fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and bluff big. Kim adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions: fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones.¶ At the risk of insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Korea’s provocations as somewhat akin to a child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top declarations (“I hate my sister,” “I’m never going back to school again”) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, **not because you think the threats are real** or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop.

Their depiction of Iran is inherently hyperbolic and reifies a violent ontology that posits it as the dangerous Other – that makes warfare inevitable

Trafton 13 (Jordan Trafton, MA student in International Relations, 3-24-13, “Securitized Iran: Threat or Not?,” <http://www.sirjournal.org/2013/03/24/securitized-iran-threat-or-not/>) gz

“Nuclear Armageddon!” and “Kissinger Predicts Nuclear war with Iran” are just a few of the striking headlines a quick Google search on Iran will lead to. The issue of Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons has been a concern in the international community for years. High military officials in the United States describe Iran as the greatest challenge to national security. However, how much truth is behind such statements? The United States reigns dominant in the international arena, disposing of foes at its whim. Is Iran a legitimate threat, or is the call to arms analogous to the invasion of Iraq post 9/11: an empty danger used to justify consolidation of political will to give funding to the military, which ultimately resulted in unnecessary violence?¶ ¶ The logic of hegemony requires the construction of threats. As the sole super power, the United States faces a world of uncertain threats to its absolute control over the globe. Each new thorn is an existential crisis to the very identity of the hegemon. This subsequently makes it impossible for the United States to distinguish between enemies that are truly in opposition to U.S. interests and those that are not. When the United States takes action and intervenes, it inevitably creates the very enemy it wished to destroy. This resistance should be predictable; take the invasion of Afghanistan for example. Over 100,000 troops were mobilized in a counter-insurgency (dubbed “COIN”) effort to eradicate militant Taliban influences in the country. However, most high-level members—those associated with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda—had already fled to locations outside of the country. The United States had this information, evident from its focused drone strikes against the Haqqani group, a labeled terrorist organization with ethnic ties to the Afghani Pashtuns, in the tribal area North Waziristan just within the Pakistani border. Nevertheless, the U.S. chose to engage in a brute-force effort to gain control of Afghanistan and “liberate” the country with the same counter-insurgency surge methods used in Iraq. This strategy, which increased boots on the ground by 60,000 between 2006-2009, ended up failing, of course, as the mountainous and diverse terrain, decentralized tribal regions, and massively corrupt government of Afghanistan posed insurmountable challenges, to name just a few setbacks. The end result was to breed more terrorist sentiment; in fact the same U.S. method used in Iraq increased terrorism worldwide sevenfold, according to Peter Bergen, a research fellow at the Center on Law and Security. Unpopular drone strikes killed innocent civilians, solidifying hatred against the United States. Insensitive and intrusive measures—middle-of-the-night searches, unjustified imprisonment, and unnecessary beatings—only added to the growing negative sentiment.¶ ¶ The lesson learned in Afghanistan can aid us in our understanding of the U.S. approach to Iran. In its efforts to justify its sole preeminence, the United States often exaggerates threats to legitimate its rule.¶ ¶ What exactly is the magnitude or probability of Iran posing a serious risk to the security of the United States? Michael Edwards, a Distinguished Fellow at Demos, gives some convincing common sense arguments in his article published last year. First and foremost, “all U.S. intelligence agencies universally agree that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program.” Iran may be developing the capabilities to build a nuclear warhead, though there is no conclusive evidence on when the red line will be crossed. Just this week, on March 14th President Obama claimed that U.S. intelligence “thinks” Iran will develop nuclear weapons in a year. “Right now, we think it would take over a year or so for Iran to actually develop a nuclear weapon.” In addition, Iran has never attacked the United States or its interests overseas. In the last 270 years Iran has not even invaded or engaged in military combat with another country, Edwards writes. Even if Iran were to possess a bomb, what logical sense would it make to attack the United States? Any strike would guarantee their immediate destruction. Though Iran’s political leaders enjoy dramatic statements, including President Ahmadinejad’s statement that Iran plans to “wipe Israel off the face of the map,” much like North Korea’s leadership, self-preservation is always their top priority. Additionally, Iran’s annual defense budget is only around $5 billion. For reference, the United States spends 110 times that amount and accounts for half the world’s defense spending combined. Nevertheless hyperbole dominates military discourse, as the recent U.S. annual Threat Report puts Iran 3rd on the list behind cyberwarfare and organized terrorism.¶ Iran has been described as a hostile threat in popular discourse following the September 11th terror attacks. Marym Jahedi analyzes the linguistic representations of Iran specifically by the New York Times in the International Journal of English Linguistics in 2012. The words we use matter in international relations; by depicting Iran as a nation state committed to violence and terror we limit our responses and proposed solutions to aggressive and militarized ones. Our lexical choices separate our friends from foes, categorizing Iran as the “out-group,” away from the allies of the United States. Jahedi elaborates further:¶ The net effect of the discourse themes, strategies and associated linguistic means of realization in the stereotypical construction of Iran in TNYT would be that of the negative Other, a nation of people that formed part of George W. Bush’s contentious “axis of evil” thesis – malevolent, untrustworthy, violent, and a threat to world peace despite the subsequent U.S. administration efforts at positive engagement for some semblance of normalcy in bilateral relations.¶ ¶ Iran may or may not stand as a legitimate threat to the United States. However, we should be aware that there is bias towards inflating the risk of a potential threat because there is a sole hegemon, demonstrated by the Afghan invasion. Pervasive headlines in the U.S. media like “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike is the Least Bad Option,” should cause hesitation; not only may such aggressively violent measures gain popularity but Iran also sees how it’s being described in discussions within the United States, suggesting a resistant stance and complicating peaceful solutions. The type of discourse surrounding U.S. engagement with Iran influences policy decisions. Recently, the United States, China, France, Russia, Britain, and Germany have started “P5+1 talks” with Iran in a renewed effort towards diplomacy. As the harsh international pressure and sanctions imposed on Iran last summer have not succeeded in halting its nuclear development, a new approach is critical. If this strategy can be genuine and sincere, unnecessary bloodshed may be avoided. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that historical depiction of Iran by the United States is one of violence and fundamentalism—a representation couched in the language of dire security. Iran has expressed interest in allowing access to the International Atomic Energy Agency for certain sites and classified data, though it hinges on the update of a comprehensive Non-Proliferation Treaty. Hopefully the United States will not give into its negatively discursive past and rather will attempt to understand the perspective of the Iranians, avoiding the friend-enemy distinction that is ever present in international relations.